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Francis: Mining Law - Ownership of Coalbed Methane - A Judicial Step towar

Case Note
MINING LAW--Ownership of Coalbed Methane-A Judicial Step
Toward Efficient CBM and Coal Development. Southern Ute Tribe v.
Amoco ProductionCompany, 119 F.3d 816 (10th Cir. 1997).

INTRODUCTION

Coalbed Methane (CBM) is a gas produced during the coalification'

process which historically had little value as an energy resource.! Recent
technological advances, however enable economically feasible extraction of
CBM, increasing its value tremendously., Conflicting opinions from the
Solicitor of the Department of the Interior and some state courts on whether

CBM is or is not part of the coal in which it is found, have raised ownership
questions potentially involving billions of dollars of income from CBM
production. Estimates vary, but roughly 90 trillion cubic feet of recoverable
CBM lay imbedded in the nation's coal reserves.4 Thus, what was once seen
as a nuisance and a safety hazard is now a valuable energy resource.' In
Southern Ute Tribe v. Amoco Production Co., the Court of Appeals for the

Tenth Circuit announced that coal reserved by the United States also includes CBM found in the coal.6
HistoricalOverview
In 1864, the Southern Ute tribe, the Uncompahgre Utes, and the White
River Utes formed the confederated band of Utes and exchanged aboriginal

land in Utah, New Mexico, and Colorado for approximately 15.7 million
acres in Southern Colorado.7 Ten years later, the Tribe ceded 3.7 million
1. Ownership of and Right to Extract Coal Bed Gas in Federal Coal Deposits, 88 mlnDec. 538, 539
(1981) (citing E. Craig and M. Myers, Ownership of Methane Gas in Coalbeds, 24 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 767-68 (1978)). Coalification is the process by which buried plant materials are transformed in to coal.
Id.
2. Jeff J. Lewin, et al., Unlocking the Fire:A Proposalfor Judicialor Legislative Determinationof the
Owersh#o of CoalbedMethane, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 563, 566-67 (1992); Southern Ute Indian Tribe v.
Amoco Prod. Co., 119 F.3d 816,823 (10th Cir. 1997).
3. Lewin, et al., sra note 2, at 576. Vertical wells are drilled to extract CBM and can also be used to
degasify the coal for mining. Combinations of vertical and horizontal boreholes allow CBM mining in
cooperation with coal mining. ,d at 577-78.
4. Id at574.
5. CBM has always existed in coal. Its combustible nature has led to the loss of many lives and inspired federal regulations on methane levels in coal mines. 30 C.F.R. §§ 57.22001-.22608 (1997); 30 C.F.R.
77.200-.217 (1997); see also 30 U.S.C. §§ 801, 861, 863 (1994).
6. SouthernUte, 119 F.3d at 836.
7. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. 159, 162 (1971).
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acres of the reservation to the United States upon discovery of mineral resources.' The Southern Utes retained the southern strip of land 15 miles
wide and 110 miles long.9 A Ute uprising in 1879 in which several nonIndians were killed led to further tribal ownership restrictions."0 In the Act
of 1880,' Congress terminated tribal ownership in the reservation lands and
allotted land parcels to individual tribal members.'" The Act provided that
the United States would hold the non-allotted lands available for sale and
allow the Utes to share in the proceeds from such sales. The Act required
the United States to hold the proceeds in trust for the Tribe." By 1882 only
the Southern Utes remained on the reservation. The Uncompahgre Utes left
for Utah, and the statute banished the White River Utes from Colorado.4
The United States opened the non-allotted lands to homesteading and
mineral exploration under a number of federal statutes." Because the United
States Geological Survey had insufficient resources to evaluate the mineral
character of all land parcels, the land was most often classified by the patent
applicant," resulting in both fraudulent and unintentional misclassification
of lands. 7 In response, in 1906 President Theodore Roosevelt withdrew
from entry 64 million acres of land considered valuable for coal resources
including the non-allotted Southern Ute Reservation land." Withdrawal was
necessary to halt reliance on the patent applicants' classifications of land
and to ensure that valuable resources could be developed and would not become unavailable because of conflicting homesteading claims."
The 1909 Coal Lands Act' served to appease homesteaders who had

8. Brunot Cession, ch. 136, 18 Stat. 673 (1864). The Southern Utes negotiated with Congress to exchange their land for land further west once minerals were discovered. At Congress's urging, the Southern
Utes agreed to the Cession. Id
9. Id
10. Id. For additional insight on the uprising known as the Meeker Massacre, see S. ExEC.Doc. No.
31,46th Cong. (1880). See also J. DuN4, MASSACRES OFTHE MOUNTAINS (1958).
11. Actofr 180,ch.223,21 Stat. 200(1890).
12. 10 CONG. RFC. 1059,2066 (1880). Congressional records indicate that the purpose of the act was to
destroy the tribal structure and to convert the Utes from a pastoral to an agricultural society. Id
13. Act of 1880, ch. 223, 21 Stat. 203-204. In part, the 1880 Act stated: Mhe land not so allotted, the
title to which is, by the said agreement of the confederated bands of the Ute Indians, and this acceptance by
the United States, released and conveyed to the United States, shall be held and deemed to be public lands
of the United States. Id
14. United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. 159, 162 (1971); Act of 1880, ch.
223, 21 Stat. 200.
15. See the Homestead Act of 1862, 43 U.S.C. §§ 161-64 (repealed 1976), the Coal Lands Act of 1873,
ch.279, 17 Stat. 607 (1873), and the Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1872).
16. Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 47 (1983). Classification of land as mineral or nonmineral was necessary to determine the price ofthe land. Id
17. Id at 48 n.9. Watt explains that with land classified as non-mineral, the patentee received title to the
entire land and the government was left with no recourse. Id
18. Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 874 F. Supp. 1142, 1149 (Clo.1995) [Amocol
19. Id. at 1149-50
20. 30 U.S.C. § 81 (1995).
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entered in good faith upon land subsequently classified as coal lands. The
Act gave homesteaders a patent in the land subject to a reservation of all
coal in the United States.' In order to encourage new agricultural development of the withdrawn lands, Congress enacted the 1910 Coal Lands Act,
which allowed for future land patents while also leaving a reservation of
coal in the United States., Homesteading and mineral exploration continued
under these statutes over the next several decades. Prospective miners patented more than 16 million acres subject to the coal reservation.',
In 1934, in an effort to restore tribal cultures, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA)P which returned to tribal ownership the remaining surplus lands of any Indian reservation that had been open to
homesteadingY In 1938, Congress conveyed the coal previously reserved to
the United States on those lands, to the Southern Ute Tribe.2
In 1991, the Southern Ute Tribe sued Amoco Production Company,
other oil companies, and individual oil and gas lessees and lessors over
ownership of coalbed methane contained in coal that the Tribe acquired
through the IRA.2 The litigation arose when the defendant companies,
through leases with surface owners, began drilling in tribally-owned coal in
preparation for development of CBM.2 In Southern Ute, Amoco and other
21. Id. The act provided in part:
Any person who has in good faith located, selected, or entered under the non-mineral land
laws of the United States any lands which subsequently are classified, claimed, or reported as
being valuable for coal, may, if he shall so elect, and upon making satisfactory proof of
compliance with the laws under which such lands are claimed, receive a patent therefor, which
shall contain a reservation to the United States of all coal in said lands, and the right to
prospect for, mine, and remove the same. The coal deposits in such lands shall be subject to
disposal by the United States in accordance with the provisions of the coal-land laws in force
at the time of such disposal, but no person shall enter upon said lands to prospect for, or mine
and remove coal therefrom, without previous consent of the owner under such patent, except
upon such conditions as to security for and payment of all damages to such owner caused
thereby as may be determined by a court of competent jurisdiction ....
Id
22. Act of June 22, 1910, ch. 318, § 1, 36 Stat. 583 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 83 (1994)). This act provided in part:
[Upon satisfactory proof of full compliance with the provisions of the laws under which entry
is made... the ennyman shall be entitled to a patent to the land entered by him, which patent
shall contain a reservation to the United States of all the coal in the lands so patented, together
with the right to prospect for, mine, and remove the same.
Id
23. Amoco, 874 F. Supp. at 1151.
24. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA), 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79
(1994)). This act marked a change in U.S. Indian policy from an assimilationist policy to one which favored
the revival of tribal culture. Amoco, 874 F. Supp. at 1151.
25. 25 U.S.C. § 463 (1995).
26. Amoco, 874 F. Supp. at 1151.
27. Id at 1146.
28. Brief for Appellant at 16, Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 119 F.3d 816 (10th Cir.
1997) (No. 94-1579) (on file with the Land & Water Law Review). Brief for Appellee at 64, Southern Ute,
119 F.3d 816 (No. 94-1579). The parties' briefs discuss the events prior to filing of the suit including the
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defendants claimed the right to develop approximately $200,000,000 worth
of CBM contained within the reserved coal.' The Southern Utes argued that
the CBM was necessarily included in the reservation of coal to the United
States in the 1909 and 1910 acts, and thus to the Tribe through the IRA.
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado held that
the reservation in coal did not include the CBM.? The court found that Congress had no intent to reserve CBM along with coal at the time Congress
passed the Acts.? The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that "the ownership
of CBM, an integral component of coal inseverable at the time of the 1909
and 1910 enactments, is vested in the Tribe as owners of the coal
resource.""1 A petition for rehearing en banc was granted in December of
1997.11
This note provides a history and background of the lands in dispute and
provides a summary of the applicable law. It also examines the Tenth Circuit's analysis of Congressional intent in the 1909 and 1910 acts and considers the effect this decision may have on past and future coal and gas interests.
BACKGROUND

CoalbedMethane
Similar in chemical composition to other hydrogen based gases," CBM
is used as an energy source for industrial and domestic purposes. Unlike
many gases, which have a more migratory nature, CBM has a tendency to
remain adsorbed' to the surface of coal. CBM is released only when the

CBM development that had begun. Additionally, Amoco's answer brief on appeal from the district court
states that Amoco drilled wells and made millions of dollars worth of preparations for mining with the
consent and understanding of the tribe that the gas owner owned the coalbed methane. Brief for appellees at
9, Amoco, 874 F. Supp 1142.
29. Amoco, 874 F. Supp. at 1147.
30. Id at 1146.
31. ld. at 1154.
32. Southern Ute, 119 F.3d at 836.
33. Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 119 F.3d 816 (10th Cir. 1997) (order granting
rehearing en banc). The court granted rehearing on the issue of whether "coal" as used in the Coal Lands
Acts unambiguously excludes or includes CBM.
34. R. MCBANE, A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE STATUS OF COALBED METHANE, COALBED METHANE
TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FutURE OF COALBED METHANE (1992); Lcwin et al., supra note 2, at 572-73.

CBM contains over 80 percent methane, making it similar to other gases. However, CBM contains no
propane, butane, pentane, carbon monoxide or sulfur compounds as does natural gas. The amount of
methane in a coal deposit depends upon factors such as coal rank, pressure, temperature, permeability
and porosity of coal. Id.
35. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 16 (10th ed. 1993). Adsorption is "adhesion in an

extremely thin layer of molecules... to the surfaces of solid bodies or liquids." Id
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coalbed is depressurized by faulting or drilling, for example.m This characteristic complicates classification of CBM since it is inevitably interrelated
to the coal in which it is found.
CBM has not always been considered a valuable resource. Commercial
mining for CBM in the United States did not begin until the 1980s.11 Prior to
that, CBM was considered a hazard and a nuisance due to its explosive nature." In order to protect mine workers, mining companies found ways to
release the gas before mining thereby reducing the danger. Thus, the right to
ownership of coal, necessarily included the responsibility of safely handling
CBM. The hazard created by methane in coal beds eventually led to federal
regulations governing the level of methane in mines."
When Congress passed the 1909 and 1910 acts, extracting CBM required removing or destroying the coal." Today, a number of means are
used to capture the gas which leave most of the coal undisturbed." A popular method is hydrofracturing, a process by which a liquid is forced into the
coal bed to fracture the coal and release the trapped gas.'2 Although CBM
mining is currently technologically feasible, there is valid concern that extraction of the gas inevitably interferes with coal mining and can affect the
value of the coal. 3 Some of the current extraction technologies can damage
mining equipment and coal seams and prevent mining of coal."
CBM Ownership
Few cases have addressed the issue of CBM ownership" and state legislatures are only beginning to consider the question." In Vines v. McKenzie
M
36. Vines v. McKenzie Methane Corp., 610 So.2d 1305, 1307 (Ala. 1993). See Southern Ut e, 119 F. 3d
at 823.
37. Vines, 610 So. 2d at 1307.
38. Lewin eta., stpranote 2, at 556. As recently as 1992, explosions in coal mines due to CBM have
killed miners. Jeff L. Lewin, Coalbed Methane: Recent Court DecisionsLeave Ownership Up in the Air,
But New Federaland State Legislation Should FacilitateProduction, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 631, 684 n.1
(1994).
39. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 801,861,863 (1994); 30 C.F.R. §§ 57.22001-.22608 (1997), 30 C.F.R. §§ 77200217(1997).
40. Southern Ute, 119 F3d at 823.
41. See Lewin et al., supra note 2, at 576, 593-97. See also NCNB Texas Nat. Bank, NA. v.West, 631
So. 2d 212,215 (Ala. 1993). These methods include: gob wells, vertical wells and horizontal boreholes.
42. Id
43. Lewin etal., supra note 2, at 593-98.
44. Id
45. Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co., Inc., 898 P. 2d 680 (Mont. 1995); Rayburn v. USX
Corp., Civ. No. 88-G-2661-W (N.D. Ala. 1987), affd, 844 F.2d 796 (11th Cir. 1988); Pinnacle Petroleum
Co. v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., Civ. No. 87-3012 (Cir. Ct. Mobile County, Ala. July 28, 1989).
46. Some legislative attempts have been made on both the federal and state levels. For an overview of
the recent developments see Lewin et al., supra note 38. See also, MoNT. CODE. ANN. § 82-1-111 (1997);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 19-9-10 (Michie 1997); UTAH CODE.ANN. § 40-6-2 (Michie 1997); W. VA CODE §§
22-21-1 to -28 (1997). The first state to adopt CBM legislation was Virginia in the Virginia Gas and Oil Act
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Methane Corporation, Alabama's Supreme Court held that "an express
grant of 'all coal' necessarily implies the grant of coalbed methane gas."4
The court looked at the methods used to mine for coal and extract CBM and
found that due to the "intertwined" nature of the resources, it would be impossible to extract one without affecting the other.4 Looking into the intent
of the parties and noting that CBM was not of value at the time of the reservation, the Vines court concluded that the parties did not intend to reserve
the gas."
A later Alabama Supreme Court case held that coal owners own the
CBM from wells drilled directly into the coal seam and that oil and gas
owners on the same parcel of land do not." The court also held that any gas
from the "gob" area" above the source coalbed belongs to the gas estate. 2
The court decided that based on the rule of capture, the right to CBM depends upon the location of the gas at the time it is recovered."
In United States Steel Corporationv. Hoge, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court held that a reservation in coal includes the right to only the methane
gas released in order to mine the coal or which is incidental to the coal mining.-" The court based its holding on the right of the miner to ventilate the
gas in order to acquire the coal, but concluded that the coal owner does not
have an absolute right to the methane."
More recently, in Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co., Inc., the
Montana Supreme Court applied the district court's decision in Southern
Ute to place CBM ownership in the hands of the gas owner., The court here
interpreted the plain meaning of a coal grant and concluded that since CBM
was not mentioned, it was not included in the grant." The court's decision
allows the coal owner to capture CBM for purposes incidental to mining but
maintains that the gas owner has the right to produce the CBM.

of 1990. The Act does not specifically address the ownership issue but provides escrow provisions, which
allow development to continue in the case of ownership disputes. The Act also gives the coal owner the
right to block hydrofracturing and provides permit procedures. VA. CODE ANN. § 45.1-361.22 (Michie

1997).
47. 619 So. 2d 1305, 1309 (Ala. 1993).
48. Id at 1308.
49. Id at 1309.
50. NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank, N.A. v. West, 631 So. 2d 212,229 (Ala. 1993).
51. A gob is produced by Iongwall mining in which a machine grinds into a wall of the coal seam. This
method causes the ceiling of the mine to collapse forming "gobs" of rubble which contain coalbed methane
that may have a tendencyto migrate upward into non-coal strata. Id at 215.

52. Id at229.
53. Id at224.
54. 450 A.2d 162,172 (Pa. Super. 1982).

55. Id.
56. Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co., Inc., 898 P.2d 680,687 (Mont 1995).
57. Id.
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Solicitor Opinions
The department of the Interior has issued two Solicitor's Opinions regarding ownership of CBM in federally-owned coal.' s The 1981 Solicitor's
Opinion, of interest here, defined the coal reservation in the 1909 and 1910
acts as excluding CBM."' The Solicitor based his opinion on the theory that
CBM and coal are distinctly different resources. 0 Legislative history representing congressional intent also informed the decision.6 The Solicitor's
Opinion was meant to expedite the development of CBM on federal land by
clarifying ownership under the 1909 and 1910 Acts.u
FederalMineralReservations
Cases involving other minerals suggest that courts generally construe
mineral rights broadly in favor of the U.S. government, giving the federal
government rights to minerals in questionable cases. In Watt v. Western Nuclear, the Supreme Court construed the Stock Raising Homestead Act
broadly to include gravel in a general mineral reservation to the United
States." The court reasoned that the statute's purpose-to encourage the
development of both the surface and the sub-surface of the land-was best
served by construing the mineral reservation broadly." The decision was
based in part on the rule that land grants are construed favorably to the government and doubts are resolved in favor of the government."
Other expansive interpretations of mineral reservations include Brennan v. Udall, in which the Tenth Circuit held that oil shale was included in a
reservation of oil," and United States v. Union Oil Company, in which a
reservation to the United States of "all coal and other minerals" was held to

58. Ownership of and Right to Extract Coal Bed Gas in Federal Coal Deposits, 88 Int Dec. 538
(1981) [hereinafter 1981 Opinion]; Rights to Coalbed Methane Under an Oil & Gas Lease for Lands in the
Jicarilla Apache Reservation, 98 Int Dec. 59 (1990). The Solicitor's second opinion, issued in 1990, clarilies the meaning of a Bureau of Indian Affairs lease form. The opinion prescribes that in such a lease, the
term "natural gas" unambiguously includes CBM. The Solicitor based his opinion on the language of the
lease and the common meaning of the words "gas" and "natural gas." According to the opinion, before
issuing a drilling permit the Department of the Interior must ensure that the drilling will occur with regard to
the rights of the coal owner. Id.
59. 1981 Opinion, supranote 58, at 545. The opinion assigned ownership of CBM to the United States
where oil and gas were reserved to the United States in agricultural patents issued under the Act of July 17,
1914.
60. Id at 540.
61. Id at 542-44.
62. Id at 539. The Tribe's brief suggests that the Solicitor's opinion was brought about after "noteworthy involvement" by Amoco. Brief for Appellant at 17, Southern Ute, 119 F.3d 816.
63. Watt v. Western Nuclear Inc., 462 U.S. 36,45 (1983).
64. Id at 47
65. Id at 59 (citing United States v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 112, 116 (1957)).
66. 379 F.2d 803, 804 (10th Cir. 1967).
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include geothermal energy."
PRINCIPAL CASE

In Southern Ute, the Tenth Circuit held that a federal reservation of
coal includes CBM gas.- In doing so the court rejected Amoco's argument
that CBM was conveyed with the land patents issued under the 1909 and
1910 acts."
Statutory Construction
Interpreting the 1909 and 1910 statutes, the Tenth Circuit followed
general principles of statutory construction. The court noted that its prin-

ciple obligation was to ascertain congressional intent."0 Throughout its
analysis, the court considered the context in which the statutes were
enacted" and adhered to the general rule of construing mineral reservations
in favor of the United States.7" The court also recognized the principle that
nothing passes except by clear conveyance."
In construing the statutes, the court began by interpreting the plain
meaning of the words." Amoco argued that the common definition of coal
at the time Congress passed the Acts did not include gaseous substances like
CBM." However, the court determined that the 1909 and 1910 Acts neither
defined coal nor mentioned CBM." Thus the statutes by their plain meaning, indicated no congressional intent regarding CBM.n In its plain meaning
analysis, the Tenth Circuit court found that due to the intermingled nature of
the minerals, "CBM ownership... cannot be disposed of by the simple
tautology that gas is gas.",
The court then examined congressional intent in both its general and
specific contexts. The court was unpersuaded by Amoco's argument that
Congress was aware of CBM as a distinct product from coal and could have
reserved it if they had so desired."' The Tenth Circuit found that CBM has
qualities sufficiently different from other gases to make it possible for Con-

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

549 F.2d 1271, 1273 (9th Cir. 1977).
Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 119 F.3d 816,836 (10th Cir. 1997).
Brief for Appellee at 94, Southern lie, 119 F.3d 816.
Southern Ute, 119F3dat820.
d at 821-24.
Id at 821. See Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36 (1983).
Southern Ute, 119F-3dat821.
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S. CL 843, 846 (1997).
Brief for Appellee at I11, Southern Ute, 119 F3d 816.
Southern Ute, 119 F.3d at 821.

77. Id.
78. Id at 822-23.
79. Id at 823.
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gress to have specifically intended it to be included in the reservationY The
court reasoned that since CBM was not valuable and not easily severable
when Congress passed the 1909 and 1910 Acts, Congress demonstrated no
specific intent whatsoever with regard to CBM ownership."
Concluding that the statutes are ambiguous with regard to specific intent, the panel considered Congress's general intent and the purpose of the
ActsY The court relied on the concept that general intent may be more reliable than specific intent when changes in circumstances indicate that specific intent may be difficult to discern." The district court had found that Congress knowingly rejected a broad meaning of the word "coal" by not including any other minerals in the reservation." However, the Tenth Circuit
found that rejection of an "all mineral" reservation does not prove congressional intent with regard to the extent of a coal reservation." The Tenth Circuit suggested that Congress knew there was indeterminate value in the coal
land and did not choose to limit the reservation to only that which was valuable in 1909 and 1910." Realizing that the coal in question could not have
been developed before advances in technology, the court concluded that
Congress meant to reserve the potential value of the coal-including the
CBM-in the United StatesU
The court continued its general intent analysis by developing a list of
related cases in which mineral reservations have been treated expansively."
For example, the Supreme Court found that gravel is a mineral reserved to
the United States in lands patented under the Stock-Raising Homestead
Act." Also, the United States District Court for the Ninth Circuit found that
geothermal energy was included in the reservation to the United States of all
coal and other minerals under the same Act."
The circuit court also addressed Amoco's argument that the Uranifer-

80. Id
81. 1d at824.
82. Id (citing Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 441 F.2d 704, 715 (10th Cir. 1971)).
83. Id. at 821-24 (citing Northern Natural Gas, 441 F2d at 715) (holding that "when a component previously regarded as an impurity becomes valuable" general intent is closer to original intent).

84. Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 874 F. Supp. 1142,1156-57 (Colo. 1995). The district court offers excerpts from congressional hearings in which possible variations of the reservation were
discussed. Also, the court pointed out the historical trend, when issuing land patents, of issuing a fee simple
absolute. The 1909 and 1910 acts were the first departure from that trend and from this the court reasoned

that the reservation in the 1909 and 1910 acts were narrow. Id See infra note 118.
85. Southern Ute, 119F.3dat826.
86. Id
87. Id

88. Id. at 826-28.
89. Watt v. Western Nuclear Inc., 462 U.S. at 53 (citing 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-301 (1916)).
90. United States v. Union Oil C., 549 F.2d 1271 at 1272. (9th Cir. 1977).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1998

9

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 33 [1998], Iss. 2, Art. 4
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXXIII

ous Lignite Act (ULA)' supports the idea that Congress recognizes a right
for land patent owners to exploit source minerals contained in federally
owned coal." The ULA specifically granted patent holders on lands where
the United States had reserved a coal interest, the right to extract uranium
and similar minerals from the coal. Amoco claimed that the ULA demonstrated congressional intent to recognize the independent nature of minerals,
including CBM." However, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that by enacting a
statute specifically allowing patent holders to extract uranium from the coal,
Congress recognized that without such a statute, the minerals would remain
an inseparable part of the coal under the 1909 and 1910 coal acts. The circuit court found that Congress did not intend a presumption that the right to
extract minerals under the ULA extended to all source minerals contained in
the coal.'
Chevron Analysis
After determining that congressional intent was unclear, the court addressed whether deference was owed to the 1981 Department of the Interior
Solicitor's Opinion which construed the 1909 and 1910 Acts to exclude
CBM from the federal coal reservation." To determine whether the Solicitor's construction of the statute was binding, the court applied the two part
test set forth in Chevron, US.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc." First, Chevron requires a determination of whether Congress "has directly spoken on the precise question at issue." If so, an agency must follow
Congress's express intent. Second, if Congress has not spoken, the court
must ask whether the agency's construction is permissible." Finding that
Congress did not speak directly to the definition of coal in the Acts, the
court proceeded to the second step of the analysis." The court was persuaded by the Tribe's argument that the effect of Chevron deference in this
case would be an adjudication of the rights of private landowners who were
neither present nor aware that this decision was being made." The panel
found that adopting the Solicitor's Opinion in this case would, in effect,
apply an opinion meant for federal coal to privately-owned coal.
In addition, by differentiating between the Solicitor's Opinion and
91. 30 U.S.C. § 541-41i (1995).
92. Id. The act authorizes surface owners to remove lignite (a low-grade coal) containing source materials such as uranium, within federal coal seams. Brief for Appellee at 119, Southern Ute, 119 F.3d 816.
93. Brief for Appellee at 119, Southern Ute, 119 F.3d 816.
94. Southern Ute, 119 F.3d at 828.
95. 1981 Opinion, supranote 59.
96. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
97. Id at842-43.
98. Southern Ute, 119 F.3d at 830.
99. Id. The agency position was put forth in order to clarify ownership as to federal lands and did not
consider private land rights. 1981 Opinion, rupra note 59, at 539.
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other agency informal rule-making procedures and adjudications, the court
found that the opinion does not warrant Chevron deference.'' Specifically,
the court noted that agency informal rule-making proceeds through a notice
and comment process, which allows for public review of a proposed regulation. A Solicitor's Opinion is merely an advisory pronouncement issued
without procedural safeguards and lacking the force of law."'1 The court
determined that while such an opinion may be afforded some consideration,
such decisions should not have binding effect."'° Moreover, the court

deemed the Solicitor's Opinion arbitrary, not well reasoned, and therefore
not entitled to deference.1" The court focused on the Solicitor's acknowledgment that coal and CBM were only potentially severable in 1909 and
1910. The panel decided it was unreasonable for the Solicitor to decide that
the 1909 and 1910 reservations excluded CBM because at the time the two
resources could not have been severed.''
The court concluded that the coal reservation to the federal government
in the 1909 and 1910 Acts includes the CBM gas found in the coal. 0,
ANALYSIS

The Tenth Circuit's determination in Southern Ute is long overdue.
The use of CBM in Europe as an energy resource began in the 1940s and
50s,1'' but development of CBM technology has been slower in the United
States, in part because of uncertainty over ownership.1' 7 CBM's growing
stature as a valuable commodity forced the court, in interpreting the 1909
and 1910 Acts, to place a relatively new resource in an old framework. A
court's statutory interpretation requires a determination of intent at the time
Congress passed the legislation." Such a determination is difficult in the
case of CBM since, at the turn of the century it was not seen as a valuable
resource but rather as a part of the coal. Thus the court was faced with legal
precedent that did not address the question at issue. While perhaps further
definition is required, the circuit court made a policy-based, practical decision that promotes economic and efficient development of CBM.

100. SouthernUte. 119 F.3d at 832.
101. Id. at833.

102. Id at 832. The court cited a number of appellate court decisions which held that Chevron deference
is only given to legislative rules and agency adjudications (citations omitted). Id
103. Id at835-36.
104. Id at836.
105. Id.
106. Lewin et al., supra note 2, at 567.
107. Id at 598.
108. Southern Ute, 119 F.3d at 820; Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 41, 42 (1979).
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Plain meaning
The court's plain meaning analysis is a crucial part of the decision. If a
statute is deemed unambiguous, then the court's "inquiry is complete, except in rare and exceptional circumstances."' Ambiguity leads a court to
consider congressional intent. The Tenth Circuit found ambiguity in the
term "coal" despite its having a commonly understood meaning. The court's
logic in finding ambiguity in this instance is compelling in view of the difficulties faced when considering a resource like CBM--essentially a constituent part of the coal resource at the time Congress passed the Acts. The
court is not entirely persuasive, however, in relying solely on the lack of a
definition of coal in the statute to demonstrate ambiguity. A statute ought

not be automatically found ambiguous because it fails to define a word that
has a commonly understood meaning. Nonetheless, coal was understood at
the turn of the century to contain gaseous substances, and CBM was a
known component of coal ownership."0 Although the statutes clearly reserve
coal and say nothing about CBM, it is probable that the plain meaning of
coal in 1909 and 1910 assumed the CBM constituent, along with the coal
owner's responsibility for safely extracting the gas."'
CongressionalIntent
CBM was not known to be valuable in 1909 and 1910, and was not considered as a separate resource upon creation of the Acts. If it was considered at
all, presumably it was thought of as a safety hazard associated with coal and a
problem for the coal owner to solve. Since Congress did not mention CBM nor
define coal in the Acts, there is no clear specific intent with respect to the
meaning of coal or CBM.'" Furthermore, CBM itself is not mentioned in the
congressional record, making it more difficult to ascertain whether Congress
affirmatively included or excluded it from the reservation.' Instead of imposing specific intent upon Congress, as the district court did, the circuit court

109. Aulston v. U.S., 915 F2,d 584,589 (10th Cir. 1990).
110. Supplemental Brief of Appellant for Rehearing en ban at 10-14, Southern Ute, 119 F.3d 816 (No.

94-1579).
111. While the district and circuit courts focus on the word "coal," the reservations also include "the right
to prospect for, mine, and remove" the coal. Incidental to mining coal, is the need to first remove CBM, as
was the case in 1909 and 1910. An inference of a right to ventilate, and even waste CBM in order to extract

coal comports with legal precedent The right to coal, in itself, does not compel a conclusion that the coal
owner owns the CBM. Nor does it necessarily exclude the right of a gas owner to recover for gas related in
mining. The court does not address this argument but it is worth confronting since it could have led the court
to a conclusion similar to that in United States Steel v. Hoge, 450 A2d 162, 172 (Pa. Super. CL 1982),
NCNB Texas Nat'7 Bank N.A. v. West, 631 So. 2d 212, 215 (Ala. 1993), or similar shared ownership arrangements. See supra notes 51 and 55. For a discussion of other possible ownership outcomes, see Lewin,
supra note 38.
112. Southern Utc, 119 F.3d at 821-22. See also U.S. v. Union Oil Co., 549 F.2d 1271, 1273 (1977).
113. Southern Ute, 119 F.3d at 821-22.
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convincingly chose to find no specific intent at all.1"
The Tenth Circuit's examination of general congressional intent and the
purpose of the statutes offers insight into interpretation of the language. The
1909 and 1910 Acts were Congress's first attempt to give less than a fee simple estate to a patent owner, signifying the beginning of the trend of narrow
government reservations."' The district court had demonstrated, through the
congressional record, an intent to define the reservation narrowly to include
only coal, thereby releasing other substances for separate development despite
where they occur., 6 Even so, such a narrow reservation does not demonstrate
what would amount to clairvoyant congressional intent to exclude or include a
substance with the unique adsorptive characteristics of CBM which was valueless and hazardous at the time of enactment. The fact that Congress may
have refused to reserve other minerals as well, does not indicate intent with
regard to the extent of the coal reservation itself, or with regard to CBM. The
purpose of the statutes was to encourage agricultural development of land
while ensuring that the mineral resources would not be kept from development.", The circuit court's determination is consistent with that purpose. The
holding does not interfere with surface land development. However, the decision does encourage production of a mineral, which has not been easily developed due to ownership questions.
The circuit court found that Congress meant to reserve the future value of
the coal including CBM."1 Much of the reserved coal was not minable at the
time and Congress was aware that it might become more valuable in the future."' Even so, it does not automatically follow that the future value in other
minerals was reserved as well. By concluding that CBM is a part of coal rather
than "another mineral," the court avoided including any other minerals,which
would be directly contrary to the congressional intent to reserve only coal.'2 '
This conclusion was reasonable considering that in the minds of both Congress

114. Id. at 822-24,
115. 43 CONG. REC. 2504 (1909).
116. Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 874 F. Supp. 1142, 1158 (Colo. 1995). The
dialogue cited by the court as evidence of intet is as follows:
Mr. Stephens: Could the gentleman better arrive at what he desires by only patenting the
surface of the land and reserving all minerals, precious and otherwise?
Mr. Mondell: That has been discussed at some length, and the Committee on Public Lands is
not of the opinion that ought not be done. We believe this is quite a sufficient departure from
the past practice of the Govenment. The lands which this legislation will affect are lands
which the department has claimed contain some coals ofvalue.
Mr. Stephens: Is not this a step in that direction of issuing limited patents?
Mr. Mondell: It is; and I trust it is as far as we will go in that direction.
45 CONG REC. 2504 (1909)
117. 43 CONG. Rac. 2504.
118. Southern Ute, 119 F.3d at 826.
119. Id See also 43 CONG. REc. 2504.
120. Southern Ute, 119 F.3d at 836.
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and coal owners it is likely that CBM was considered part of the coal reserved.
To inform the analysis of general intent, the court compared the Coal
Acts to the Agricultural Entry Act (AEA)'I ' and the Stock Raising Homestead
Act (SRHA)."2 The court demonstrated a tendency for the judiciary to interpret
the various statutes broadly to include minerals not specified in the language.
The plain language in both the AEA and SRHA provides for multiple mineral
reservations.- Accordingly, these statutes have potential for more expansive
interpretation. In Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc.," the court interpreted "minerals" in the SRHA broadly to include gravel. The United States Supreme Court
in Watt noted that precedent exists for defining gravel as a mineral,' whereas
in Southern Ute no dispositive supporting law included CBM with a coal reservation. Although distinguishable, Watt is an example of a broad interpretation of a mineral-reserving statute.
Brennan v. Udall demonstrates a situation similar to that in Southern Ute.
The Tenth Circuit in Brennan included oil shale in an oil reservation under the
AEA."' Oil shale and oil are widely accepted to be interrelated, as are coal and
CBM. The determination in Brennan is preceded by years of treating oil and
oil shale as one substance in various statutes and agency decisions.- Similarly,
evidence such as regulations governing methane levels in mines and dictionary
definitions in the early 1900s, supports the idea that coal and CBM were historically thought of as interrelated.' 2'
United States v. Union Oil demonstrates perhaps the broadest interpretation of a mineral-reserving statute, however there the court interpreted a general term--"minerals."'2' Union Oil is similar to Southern Ute because it dealt
with geothermal steam, a mineral that had a newly appreciated value.'" The
court noted that there was no mention of geothermal steam in the SRHA itself,
or its legislative history."' However, the scope of the Act considered by that
court and the legislative history allow for an expansive interpretation. 2 Because the steam was of no commercial value in 1916, the court held that Congress had no specific intent to reserve it. In Union Oil, the court found that it

121. 30 U.S.C. §§ 121-25(1914).

122. 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-301 (1916).
123. 30 U.S.C. §§ 121-25(1914) (reserving "phosphate, nitrate, potash, oil, gas, or asphaltic minerals");
43 U.S.C. §§ 291-301(1916) (reserving "all coal and other minerals').
124. 103 S. CL 2218 (1983).
125. Id
126. 379 F.2d 803 (1967).
127. Id at 806-07.
128. See supranotes 40 and 112.
129. 549 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1977).

130. Id at 1273.
131. Union Oil, 549 F.2d at 1273.
132. Id
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would not be inconsistent with Congress's general intent of encouraging agricultural development while still maintaining U.S. ownership of the resources
to include geothermal steam with the reservation.'"
The court's discussion of the ULA lends more context to the analysis.3 '
With the ULA, Congress gave surface owners the right to mine for source
materials within the coal reserved to the United States in the 1909 and 1910
Acts.' This demonstrates a willingness for Congress to separate two concurrent minerals. But as the court found, a specific statute was required to do so.
This comports with the view that minerals within coal were presumed to be a
part of the coal until specifically omitted. Congress has not specifically excluded CBM from the statutes though the gas has been deemed valuable for
some time. This failure to statutorily except CBM from the reservation indicates a congressional intent to maintain concurrent ownership.'16
Chevron
The court's Chevron analysis focused on the method by which Solicitor's
opinions are promulgated. 7 This aspect of the decision is not being reheard by
the en banc court but still requires some analysis."' Without the notice and
comment process, the court was rightly concerned that private landowners
who had no knowledge of the decision would be affected." Hesitant to give
deference to an opinion that would have a substantial impact on private coal
and gas rights, the court refused to be bound by it'The court specifically refused to address the degree of deference due the
Solicitor's Opinion as it concerns federal coal interests."' The decision may
nonetheless be persuasive in determining CBM ownership in that context. If
agencies are concerned about the opinion's persuasive force, they may choose
to create formal rules contrary to this opinion.
Policy Analysis
More important than the legal analysis perhaps, is the practical effect of
133. Id at 1274-75.
134. Southern Ute, 119 F.3d at 827-28.
135. 30 U.S.C. § 541-541i(1994).
136. Additionally, this act allowed removal of minerals from lignite coal and CBM is found mostly in
anthracitic and steam coals. ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRiTANMCA: A DICTIONARY OF ARTS, SCIENCES,
LrrERATURE AND GOENEAL INFORMAniON 588 (1 th ed. 1910).
137. Southern Ute, 119F.3dat 832-33.
138. See supranote 33.
139. Southern Ute, 119 F.3d at 830.
140. Southern Ute, 119 F. 3d at 836 n.26. The court explained that deference is not owed to the Solicitor's Opinior in the case of private land interests but did not address the degree of deference due in
the case of federal land interests or federal lease forms. id
141. Id.
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the court's decision. Southern Ute achieves two important policy objectives.
First, it helps to clarify the law of CBM ownership, thereby promoting future
CBM development. Second, it creates the potential for developing the competing resources efficiently by providing for one owner of both resources.
Clarity with regard to CBM ownership is important where uncertainty
existed. Negotiations regarding CBM and its development have been slow
because of ownership doubts." Developers would conceivably be hesitant to
contract or invest in extraction technology without confirmation of ownership.
Some uncertain landowners simply vent what is otherwise valuable gas."3
Other reasons for the delayed technological development include the potential
of CBM production to restrict the independence of mining operations and interfere with coal extraction in general.'"
By putting coal and CBM in the hands of one party, the court encourages
both development and efficiency. Already, the coal owner is required to
monitor and vent CBM, thus they will already have technologies in place for
handling the gas. Removal of CBM is vital to the development of the coal,
rendering the two integrally related.' Under this decision, owners will be
encouraged to conserve valuable energy resources by coordinating coal and
CBM development.
A decision in favor of Amoco on the other hand, would have created
competing interests with no means of resolution. The commingled nature of
the resources due to the adsorptive tendency of CBM and the current methods of extraction would require cooperation of separate coal and CBM owners. This would increase litigation over issues such as waste and development practices. The future value of the coal is speculative as mining technology continues to improve. Calculating damages owed to a coal owner
would be difficult if a CBM owner were held liable. More importantly, perhaps, a decision for Amoco would have put every developer of a coal estate
at risk for damages to the owner of the gas resources. Such a result could
inhibit coal development and would certainly increase the likelihood of litigation between the coal and gas owners. Southern Ute avoids this outcome,
arguably preventing large amounts of litigation.
142. Lewin et al., supra note 2, at 575.
143. d at568.
144. Id. at 569 n.16.

145. The court in its analysis gives the impression that these resources are unavoidably competing. In
fact the CBM in question is found in the deepest coalbeds and is, for all practical purposes, currently unminable. This detracts from the court's reasoning, suggesting that perhaps these particular minerals are not
necessarily competing. The court does not address this in its decision, but regardless, the practicality of the
holding is still apparent. Lewin et al., supra note 2, at 650. Lewin notes that CBM in the eastern United
States is found within minable coal. This could make the analysis with regard to CBM different depending
upon the geographic location of the coal. A blanket rule with regard to CBM ownership is illogical then, if it

is based upon the unseverability characteristic.
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Since the Solicitor's Opinion, considerable development and financial
investment has been made in federally-owned coal.-M If found persuasive in
the federal context, Southern Ute may render these investments futile. The
court does not consider whether reliance upon the Solicitor's Opinion would
have been reasonable or whether, if reliance were demonstrated, a remedy
would be available. While the court attempts to limit the application of its
decision to the lands at issue, it may be found persuasive in unintended
contexts such as analogous cases in which the ownership of other coexisting
minerals is split. At least one court has relied on the district court's opinion
in the context of a coal grant outside the Coal Lands Act.' This expansion
of the circuit court's holding could pose a problem since the decision may
be relied on in less applicable situations and have a confusing and inconsistent effect on the law which traditionally treats gas as gas. Neither does the
court sufficiently address the decision's possible overriding effect on state
statutes, which legislate CBM ownership and production.'"
Further agency refinement of CBM ownership in federal coal interests
is necessary and appropriate. Regulations governing leasing would be helpful as would guidance defining rights of compensation for gas which may
have migrated from other sources outside the coal.",
CONCLUSION

Advances in technology have made development of CBM increasingly
valuable in recent years. This decision is a positive step in defining CBM
ownership in light of its coming of age. The Tenth Circuit decision clarifies
some ownership questions and facilitates development of CBM. The decision is supported by law and consistent with the policy of encouraging agricultural and economic development, conservation, and technological advancement. But this pragmatic decision leaves some questions unanswered.
At least 127,000 land patents are affected by this decision including over
20.4 million acres of land in Colorado, New Mexico, Wyoming and Utah."With its decision, the court offers the agency the opportunity to more

146. Appellees petition for rehearing en ban at 2, Southem Ute, 119 F.3d 816. According to the petition,
many private landowners have depended on royalties from CBM development since the Solicitor's Opinion
was issued in 1981. Id
147. Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co., 898 P2d 680, 686 (Mont. 1995). In this case, the Supreme Court of Montana overruled the carlier trial court decision. It held that under Amoco, a grant of coal
did not include CBM.
148. See Lewin, supra note 38. Since states have begun to legislate CBM ownership, there could be

inconsistencies between state and federal treatment of the gas.

149. Gases have the potential to migrate from other strata and then become mixed with the CBM. This
detracts from the argument that CBM is a part of coal since it is created by and from coal. Lewin, spra note
38, at 639-40.
150. Defendants' Petition for Rehearing en banc at 2, Southern Ute, 119 F.3d 816.
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thoroughly define CBM interests. Despite the court's failure to defer to the
Solicitor's Opinion, the agency should confirm the outcome of the panel
decision and establish policy for applying the decision in all relevant contexts through rulemaking procedures. The Tenth Circuit's panel decision
sensibly maximizes production of both CBM and coal resources and provides some measure of certainty in a manner that promotes mineral development. The en banc panel should affirm the three judge panel's decision.
KATiNA L. FRANCIS
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